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ABSTRACT 
This article interrogates a specific legal response to the unauthorised arrival of asylum 
seekers to Canada by sea. It focuses in particular on the treatment of such individuals after 
they have been recognised as refugees under the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention). It is a critical analysis of the introduction of the Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act (PCISA) in Canada, which amends the Immigration 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The article focuses on the establishment of the new legal 
status of Designated Foreign National (DFN) under the PCISA. In the article, it is argued that 
this response has resulted in the creation of legal standards that undermine the rights 
guaranteed to recognised refugees in the Refugee Convention. The establishment of the status 
of the DFN also represents the creation of a legal space where those who are designated are 
confronted by various restrictions that have been established as a response to anxiety about 
the arrival of asylum seekers to the state by sea. This article examines how the creation of the 
DFN status has shifted the approach to the regulation of space in Canada. Drawing on critical 
legal studies, as well as critical legal geography, this article focuses on the interrelationship 
between legal knowledges, and control over space as it relates to the DFN. Finally, the article 
examines how it may be possible for DFNs to oppose the creation of a two-tier system of 
refugee protection under the PCISA by asserting their rights under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article draws on the discourse surrounding the establishment of the PCISA in order to 
show how it contributed to the creation of the restrictive status of the DFN refugee.
1
 This 
article analyses the creation of the DFN status as a form of spatial control. It also considers 
the possibility of resisting the content of the status on the basis of section 15 of the Charter. 
Under the PCISA, those who arrive to the state as part of a group associated with a suspected 
smuggling or criminal operation may be categorised as DFNs.
2
 The DFN status tends to 
primarily affect asylum seekers who arrive as a part of a group to the state by boat. However, 
under the PCISA, any person who is categorised as part of such a group continues to be 
considered to be a DFN, even after she has been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee 
Convention.
3
 She also continues to be considered a DFN for five years after she has acquired 
refugee status, until she is permitted to apply for a permanent residence status.
4
 Part 2 of the 
article sets out the features of DFN status as established in the PCISA. In part 2, I note the 
significant restrictions that those categorised as DFNs are subject to under the PCISA, even if 
they apply for, and are granted, asylum under the Refugee Convention. Part 3 then examines 
the language used in the debates leading up to the introduction of the PCISA. I contend that 
the narrative of the refugee presented in the debates shaped the content and the scope of the 
DFN status. As the state was not able to control the initial entry of the DFN into the territory 
of the state, punitive restrictions were thereafter applied to the DFN in the name of deterring 
future unauthorised arrivals. In order to achieve this, one of the key focuses of the legislation 
was to limit and control the movement of those designated as DFNs after they had arrived. In 
the parliamentary debates leading up to the establishment of the PCISA, the DFN was 
repeatedly characterised as illegal and illegitimate. It is argued that such descriptions of the 
                                                          
1
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, as amended by Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
System Act 2012, SC 2012, c17, (PCISA). For ease of reference, in this article, provisions of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act that were introduced under the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act will be 
referred to as coming under the PCISA. Provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that pre-date 
the 2012 amendment will be referred to as coming under the IRPA.  
2
 Under s 20.1 (2) of the PCISA, persons who are part of such groups are automatically designated unless they 
are able to produce a visa or other documentation under the regulation and, on examination, the officer is 
satisfied that they are not inadmissible. 
3
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 2545, as amended 
by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (Refugee Convention). 
4
 PCISA, s 11 (1.1). 
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DFN enabled the government to rationalise the lesser legal status granted to DFNs under the 
PCISA, even if they had been recognised as refugees.  
In part 4 it is argued that the treatment of the DFN embodies a biopolitical management of 
life. In the legislation, it is suggested that the problem of the DFN is to be neutralised through 
the categorization and management of the DFN. The article establishes that the restrictions 
that are placed on the DFN under the PCISA assume a spatial logic, where the state imagines 
ways to prevent the movement of the refugee within as well as outside the state. After she is 
recognised as a refugee, the DFN is subject to a kind of suspended status. This article 
emphasises that the precariousness of the DFN’s legal status in the state is exemplified 
through the consistent reinforcement of the threat of her removal from the state.  
Part 5 notes that while the DFN may technically be recognised as a refugee under the 
Refugee Convention, the standard of protection that the Canadian Government is willing to 
offer the DFN is little more than protection from refoulement. By classifying an individual as 
a DFN, the state makes the decision to subject her to a lesser legal status, even if she has a 
claim to refugee protection as set out in the Refugee Convention. This represents a scalar 
shift in the treatment of the DFN. The DFN is no longer considered to be a refugee, deserving 
of international protection, but primarily as an irregular migrant, a person who has 
deliberately flouted domestic immigration rules. In effect, the DFN is reduced to a threat to 
the security of the state in the eyes of the law. The final section of this article considers how 
the establishment of a second-tier refugee status protection under the PCISA raises issues in 
relation to constitutional guarantees to equality and non-discrimination under section 15 of 
the Charter.
5
  
2. THE PCISA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DFN STATUS  
Under the PCISA, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration may determine that a group of 
people will be categorised as irregular arrivals if he is of the belief that they have entered 
Canada as part of a smuggling operation.
6
 The PCISA describes an irregular arrival at 
sections 20.1(1)(a) and (b) as a group of persons who the Minster believes he cannot 
successfully carry out investigations as to their identity or admissibility, or any other 
examination in a timely manner. A person may also be deemed to be an irregular arrival if the 
                                                          
5
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule  
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (the Charter). 
6
 PCISA, s 20.1 (1).  
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Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect that there has been, or will be, ‘human smuggling 
for the benefit or profit of, at the direction, or in association with a criminal organisation or 
terrorist group’.7 The irregular arrival then automatically becomes a DFN unless she holds the 
documents required for entry; and the officer is satisfied that she is not admissible to 
Canada.
8
 The Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers has pointed out that two people 
arriving together to Canada could potentially be identified as a group for the purposes of the 
PCISA, in the absence of a definition of a ‘group’ within the context of the PCISA.9 
While a person is designated on the basis of her arrival to the state with a group, her 
individual rights as an asylum seeker, and possibly later as a refugee, that are substantially 
affected by designation under the PCISA. The legislation was initially drawn up as a response 
to the arrival of migrants to Canada aboard the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea in 2009 
and 2010 respectively.
10
 As is the case with unauthorized boat migrants arriving to states, 
most of those aboard the MV Sun Sea and the MV Ocean Lady went on to apply for asylum 
in Canada. This means that the status of DFN directly targets asylum seekers who arrive in an 
unauthorized manner to the state.
11
 Under the PCISA therefore, DFNs are categorized on the 
basis of their mode of arrival rather than, for instance, on the apparent merit of their asylum 
application.
12
 Consequently, under the PCISA, those who have been designated are treated 
first as DFNs, and second as asylum seekers and (potentially) refugees. 
                                                          
7
 PCISA, s 20.1(1) (b).  
8
 PCISA, s 20.1(2) 
9
Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, The Unconstitutionality of Bill C-4, Submission on the Preventing 
Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada's Immigration System Act, (October 2011) < http://www.cdp-
hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/documents/TheUnconstitutionalityofBillC4final.pdf> accessed 
22 April 2014. 
10
 An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act and the 
Marine Transportation Security Act 2010 (Bill-C49). It should also be noted that on February 16 2015, the 
Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers intervened in a two day case hearing at the Supreme Court of Canada 
relating to the legality of Canada’s human smuggling laws and the criminalisation of refugees and refugee 
claimants. The issue being decided relates to 5 cases of alleged human smuggling. A number of the cases 
involve refugee claimants who arrived among the MV Sun Sea and MV Ocean Lady. At the time of going to 
print, a decision has yet to be released. See, ‘CARL Argues Human Smuggling Laws Unconstitutional In 
Supreme Court’, (Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, 16 February 2015) < http://www.carl-
acaadr.ca/articles/CARLArguesHumanSmugglingLawsUnconstitutional> accessed 3 April 2015. 
11
 Canada faced a similar situation in 1999 when 599 boat migrants from China arrived to the state and sought 
asylum. As MacIntosh notes, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 207 (IRPA) was 
established as a response to this arrival, much like how the PCISA has been established as a response to the 
2009 and 2010 arrivals to the state. See C MacIntosh, ‘Insecure Refugees: The Narrowing of Asylum Seeker 
Rights of Freedom of Movement and Claims Determination Post 9/11 in Canada’ (2011-2012) 16 (2) Rev of 
Constit. Studies 181- 209, 186. 
12
 For example, asylum applicants’ claims that are determined to be manifestly unfounded are treated differently 
under Canadian law from other asylum seekers whose initial application fails because the former category are 
not entitled to lodge an appeal against such a decision. (s 107(1) Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 
2001, c 27 (IRPA)). 
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If an individual who has been designated under the PCISA then goes on to apply for asylum 
in Canada, her rights will be restricted in a way that is not experienced by other asylum 
seekers in the state. Thereafter, her status as a DFN will remain for at least five years after 
she has been granted refugee status, until she is able to access either a temporary or 
permanent residence status in Canada.
13
 Therefore, with the introduction of the PCISA, 
Canada has deliberately endeavoured to grant those who arrive to the state by sea, and are 
later granted refugee status, a temporary legal status in the state. Categorization of individuals 
as DFNs results in a legal status of ‘permanent temporariness’ for many years after those who 
are designated first enter the state.
14
 Under the PCISA, a person may be designated at the 
point of entry to the State, or at a later stage, after she has entered and applied for asylum.
15
 
The latter provision has been included in the PCISA in order to allow for those who arrived 
aboard the MV Sun Sea in 2010 to be retrospectively designated as irregular arrivals.
16
  
The PCISA states that those assessed to be DFNs may be arrested and detained.
17
 The 
detention for those deemed to be DFNs is automatic and mandatory for all over the age of 
16.
18
 A DFN may be released from detention if a final determination is made on her refugee 
claim,
19
 if an order for her release is made by the Immigration Division of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB),
20
 or if a ministerial order is made for her release.
21
 The DFN is 
also subject to detention review procedures which are specific to the DFN.  
The PCISA provides for notably less frequent review of the detention of DFNs in comparison 
to all other asylum seekers or migrants who are detained under Canadian immigration law. 
For most asylum seekers and immigrants subject to immigration detention in Canada, the 
review of their detention is regulated by section 57.1 of the IRPA 2001 before it was 
amended by the PCISA. Anyone held under that provision of the IRPA must have their 
                                                          
13
 PCISA, s 11(1.1). 
14
 A Bailey, R Wright, A Mountz, I Miyares, ‘(Re)producing Salvadoran transnational geographies’ (2002) 92 
(1) Ann Assoc Am Geogr 125- 144, 125 and 138. 
15
 PCISA, s 81(1), ‘A designation may be made under subsection 20.1(1) of the Act, as enacted by section 10, in 
respect of an arrival in Canada — after March 31, 2009 but before the day on which this section comes into 
force — of a group of persons’. 
16
 ibid. 
17
 PCISA, s 55(3.1). A person maybe arrested and detained if they are categorized as a designated foreign 
national. This may occur at the point of entry to Canada (s 55(3.1)(a)), or after they have entered Canada if they 
are deemed to have become a designated foreign national at a later point (section 55(3.1)(b)). Under this section, 
an individual may be arrested and detained without the requirement that the authorities obtain a warrant for such 
an arrest and detention. 
18
 PCISA, s 56(2). 
19
 ibid. 
20
 ibid. 
21
 PCISA, s 58(1). 
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detention reviewed within 48 hours. A subsequent review must then be carried out within 
seven days of the initial review and thereafter at least once every 30 days.
22
 The PCISA 
amends section 57.1 of the IRPA to include a less frequent detention review procedure for 
DFNs. Under section 57.1(1) of the PCISA, the detention of DFNs must be reviewed after 14 
days. Thereafter, it is to be reviewed at a six month interval, commencing after the initial 
review. The disparity in treatment between immigrants detained as DFNs under the PCISA 
and other immigrants is therefore striking. The Immigration Division of the IRB has the 
power to release the DFN, subject to conditions, however, if the DFN breaches any of these 
conditions, her application for temporary or permanent residence status may thereafter be 
refused.
23
 
Even after a DFN has been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, she is still 
subject to a range of restrictions on her rights and freedoms that other refugees present in the 
state are not.
24
 Her freedom of movement is restricted because she is not allowed to access to 
a Refugee Convention Travel Document and she is precluded from even applying for a 
permanent resident status for a period of 5 years.
25
 In Canada, only permanent residents are 
eligible to access family reunification, therefore DFN refugees are also prevented from 
applying to be joined by their family for at least five years.
26
 In addition, DFN refugees are 
not considered to be lawfully present in the state.
27
 The DFN refugee is therefore denied the 
full set of rights set out in the Refugee Convention, even though she has been recognised as a 
Convention refugee by the Canadian State.
28
 The right to permanent residence or access to 
family unity is not specifically provided for in the Refugee Convention. However, other 
recognised refugees living in Canada are able to gain access to these rights, without facing 
the same obstacles and exclusions that DFN refugees do. This demonstrates that DFN 
refugees have been isolated and targeted by a specific policy that deprives them of rights 
available to other refugees in Canada.  
                                                          
22
 PCISA, s 57(1). 
23
 PCISA, s 58(4), PCISA, s 11(1.3)(a). 
24
 In the present article, designated foreign nationals who have been recognised as refugees are referred to as 
‘DFN refugees’. 
25
 PCISA, s 110(2)(a) and s 11(1.1). 
26
 Under s 176(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (IRPR), the family of 
a refugee who are outside Canada have one year from the time that the refugee is granted refugee status to make 
an application for permanent residence status. Under s 176(1), the family of a refugee who are present in the 
state may make an application for permanent residence at the same time as the refugee and have their 
application processed concurrently.  
27
 As the DFN is not considered to be ‘lawfully staying’ in the state, as per art1A of the Refugee Convention, 
she is deemed to not be entitled to a travel document. See PCISA, s 31(1). The DFN must submit to reporting 
requirements as a condition of her legal status, see PCISA, s 98(1) and s 98(2).  
28
 ibid. 
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The system introduced with the PCISA normalises precariousness for a certain group of 
refugees, by denying them the possibility of applying for permanent residence for at least five 
years. The treatment of the DFN under the PCISA is representative of what Goldring et al 
have referred to as the ‘legal production of illegality’ in Canada.29 However, the creation of 
the category of DFN also challenges the accepted distinction between who is legal and who is 
illegal in the state. DFNs are recognised as refugees, yet the legal status that they are subject 
to differentiates them from all other refugees present in the state. It marks them and their 
mode of entry into the state as illegitimate. As discussed below, the DFN disrupts the 
preferred mode of entry of refugees and migrants to the state. For this reason, the legal status 
that she is thereafter subject to is one which has been constructed in order to deter refugees 
and migrants from arriving to the state in such a manner. By designating someone as a DFN, 
the state gives the appearance of having reasserted control over the movement of 
unauthorised asylum seekers to the state. However, the status of the DFN is also a means of 
controlling and managing the refugees within the state.  
3. THE DFN: CHALLENGING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE REFUGEE IN 
THE CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SYSTEM  
The establishment of the DFN status is part of Canada’s effort to regulate the kinds of 
refugees that may enter and remain in the state. During the debates, many of the government 
representatives referred to the dichotomy between two types of refugee coming to Canada. 
The first kind of refugee had come to the state through so-called legitimate means, either as a 
resettled refugee, or arriving to the state with a valid visa (usually by air) and applying for 
asylum upon arrival. These movements were considered to be part of the general machinery 
of the immigration and asylum system. These arrivals were therefore not obvious to the 
public, occurring away from the public gaze, often as quiet movements through controlled 
and regulated spaces like airports. The second type of asylum seeker was someone who had 
come to the state through illegal means, usually visibly. The DFN status was therefore 
created to target those who had arrived visibly at the borders of the state, central to the public 
gaze. The DFN was someone seeking protection, who did not have the opportunity to rely on 
                                                          
29
 Goldring et al refer to four elements where if any element is absent, this indicates that a person has a 
precarious status in the state. These elements are 1) work authorization, 2) the right to remain permanently in the 
country (residence permit), (3) not depending on a third party for one’s right to be in Canada (such as 
sponsoring spouse or employer), and (4) social citizenship rights available to permanent residents Two of these 
elements are absent for the DFN (2 and 4). The DFN is clearly subject to a precarious status in the state. L 
Goldring, C Bernstein and J K Bernhard, ‘Institutionalizing precarious migratory status in Canada’ (2009) 13(3) 
Citizenship Studies 239- 265, 239-241. 
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a legal path to enter the state. She was therefore forced to seek out points of the border which 
allowed for ‘subversive’ movement in order to enter.30  
 
The arrival of those on board the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea was viewed as 
signifying the loss of control that the state had over its borders.
31
 After the MV Sun Sea 
arrived at the shores of British Columbia, both the state and the public viewed themselves as 
being overrun. Initial reports linked the arrivals to terrorist organisations in Sri Lanka.
32
 
However, as it became clear that most of those on board did not have such links, but were in 
fact seeking asylum, the government then began to attack the legitimacy of the claims of 
those on board. The key narrative that the government articulated during the debates was that 
anyone who arrived to the state in such a manner could not possibly be seeking the protection 
of the state. In order to further justify the treatment of the DFN, the state emphasised that the 
action it was taking was in order to ensure that it was able to grant refugee status to those 
who had not arrived to the state by sea. These refugees, unlike those who arrived by sea, were 
referred to as deserving of protection. According to the government, the PCISA and the DFN 
status would benefit the genuine refugees, while excluding asylum who had arrived 
unauthorised to the state.  
…we're taking people who are legitimately waiting to be recognized and accepted as 
having refugee status in this country, who are waiting in the system for 1,038 days, 
and we're cutting that down by some 75% to 80%...We're weeding away the people 
who don't have legitimate claims and who are clogging up the system.
33
 
                                                          
30
 W Walters, ‘Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (Non-) Citizenship’ in E Isin and G Neilson 
(eds), Acts of Citizenship (Zed Books 2008) 182-207, 198. 
31
 The PCISA amends many of the provisions of the IRPA. MacIntosh notes that while the IRPA was enacted 
shortly after the events of September 11
th
, that legislation was first tabled in response to the arrival of boats of 
Chinese migrants to British Columbian shores in 1999. See C MacIntosh, above n 11, 186. 
32
 M Youssef, ‘Migrant held on suspicion of ties to Tamil Tigers’ (The Globe and Mail, 8 September 2010) 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/migrant-held-on-suspicion-of-ties-to-tamil-
tigers/article1369321/ > accessed 3 April 2015. However, even without definitive proof of links to terrorism, the 
public reaction was that of fear and suspicion toward those on board the MV Sun Sea. During the debates 
leading up to the introduction of the PCISA, Brian Sorseth (CPC) noted, ‘The reaction of most Canadians was 
swift. In an Angus Reid poll shortly after the MV Sun Sea arrived, almost half of the Canadians surveyed said 
they believed that all passengers and crew should be deported, even if they were found to have no links to 
terrorism. That is a telling number and, quite frankly, one we cannot ignore’. House of Commons Debates 41st 
Parl, 1
st
 Sess, No. 16 (11 Sept 2011) at 1218 (Brian Storseth). (The style used for the citation of the 
parliamentary debates adheres to that set out in Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation, (Carswell, 7
th
 edn, 
2010)). 
33
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41
st
 Parl, 1
st
 Sess, No. 31 (26 Apr 2012) at 13 (Costas 
Menegakis). 
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Statements such as this, made during the debates on the PCISA, deliberately conflated the 
legitimacy of the claim that was being made by the refugee with the legality of the way that 
the refugee entered the state. The restrictions affecting the DFN were therefore applied as a 
result of the perceived need to protect and preserve the immigration regulations and improve 
the overall efficiency of the system.
34
 Spontaneous arrivals, particularly those arriving by 
boat to the state such as the DFN, trouble and disrupt the accepted method of accommodating 
refugees in Canada. As Mountz has noted: 
States do not grant refugee status to everyone, and in their decision-making, they 
often pit the agency of the state against that of the refugee. Those who arrive of their 
own volition are called ‘spontaneous arrivals’, and they are punished for exercising 
their own agency.
35
 
In the case of Canada, the government representatives refer to the state as almost 
volunteering to assist the refugee rather than being bound under international law to provide 
assistance. Any protection offered to the refugee, and thereafter any other residence status or 
citizenship granted to the refugee, is framed as a ‘gift’.36 Those asylum seekers who use their 
agency to access the state through irregular means, and who are designated under the Act, are 
punished for doing so, initially while they are asylum seekers, and later when recognised as 
refugees as they await access to permanent residence status. As discussed below, this position 
is consistent with the manner in which the government has interpreted the Refugee 
Convention. 
It is clear from the above statement by Mr Menegakis that those who were categorised as 
DFN were considered to be ‘illegitimate’ refugees. Since DFN refugees are not entitled to a 
permanent residence status for five years after they have been recognised as being in need of 
a protection status, they are therefore excluded from accessing family reunification for at 
least five years after they have been recognised as refugees. While it is acknowledged that 
some refugees face obstacles to accessing permanent residence status after they have had 
their asylum claims accepted, they do not face the same automatic delay and exclusion that 
DFN refugees do. Permanent residence status was denied to DFNs with the specific goal of 
                                                          
34
 This is clear from the statement of Bryan Hayes (CPC) ‘We need to ensure that such an important system is 
always operating in our national interest and as effectively and efficiently as possible’, House of Commons 
Debates 41
st
 Parl, 1
st
 Sess, No. 111 (23 Apr 2012) at 7001 (Brian Hayes). 
35
 A Mountz, ‘Refugees – Performing Distinction: Paradoxical Positionings of the Displaced’ in T Cresswell 
and P Merriman (eds), Geographies of Mobilties: Practices, Spaces, Subjects (Ashgate 2011) 258. 
36
 ibid.  
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excluding DFN refugees from being able to access family reunification.
37
 The denial of 
permanent residence and the consequences of this denial therefore took on the character of 
punishment for entering the state in an unauthorized manner. As Minister Jason Kenney 
stated prior to the introduction of the PCISA: 
The problem is that it is very difficult to apply Canadian law to the smugglers who 
live overseas. That is why we need to include deterrents in the bill for the potential 
clients of the smugglers. That is why we are proposing a five-year temporary 
residence period instead of permanent residence for immigrants who arrive here 
illegally and who are recognized as protected persons. We have to have deterrents for 
the clients in order to reduce the human smuggling market.
38
 
In this way, the responsibility for the illegal act of smuggling is shifted from the smuggler to 
the person who is trying to enter the state. The government portrays the person seeking 
protection in the state as having a choice between entering the state illegally and waiting to 
access the state legally, either by accessing a travel visa, or coming to the state as resettled 
refugees. The narrative conveyed is that by relying on smugglers, the asylum seeker has made 
a choice to disobey the laws of Canada, and for that, she is punished according to Canadian 
law. As discussed below, this rationalisation does not engage with the reasons as to why a 
person may need to flee her country of origin. The person seeking asylum by boat is not 
therefore seen as someone who is in need of international protection, but rather an immigrant 
who has not gone through the correct channels in order to access the territory of the state. The 
root source of the illegal entry, the smuggler, is depicted as being outside Canadian territory, 
beyond the scope of the criminal justice system. The blame is therefore displaced from the 
smuggler to the asylum seeker and thereafter the refugee, who effectively acts as a proxy for 
the punishment that would have been directed to the smuggler. This is a clear example of 
what Cowan et al have referred to as the ‘culture of responsibility’.39 Canada presents itself as 
not being accountable for not providing groups arriving to the state in an irregular manner 
with an acceptable standard of protection. Instead, the DFNs are punished for violating the 
immigration rules of the state and arriving in an unacceptably spontaneous manner to the 
state. While it may not be possible to prosecute the DFN under the criminal justice system for 
                                                          
37
 ‘We must prevent individuals who come to Canada as part of a designated human smuggling operation from 
sponsoring family members for a period of up to five years’, House of Commons Debates 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No. 
16, at 1213 (Mike Wallace). 
38
 House of Commons Debates, 41
st
 Parl, 1
st
 Sess, No. 108, at 7048 (Jason Kenney).  
39
 D Cowan, C Hunter, H Pawson, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale: Rent Arrears, Social Housing, and Human Rights’ 
(2012) 39(2) JL & Soc 269-295, 290. 
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her use of a smuggler, the state draws on the illegality of the circumstances surrounding the 
entry of the DFN in order to establish a lesser legal status.
40
 This was done not only in order 
to deter other migrants from arriving in a similar way, but to exercise control over the DFNs 
present in the state.   
The goals associated with the creation of the DFN status under the PCISA can be compared 
to the temporary legal status that the United States Government granted to people who 
arrived to the state from El Salvador in the 1980s.
41
 As Coutin has noted in relation to the 
Salvadorans: 
Because illegal immigration is not eliminated by criminalizing unauthorized entry, 
law appears weak. In contrast, shifting the focus from the law’s ability to control entry 
to immigrants’ attempts to negotiate their legal status in the United States suggests 
that, far from being powerless, law is critical to both immigrants’ and authorities’ 
political maneuverings.
42
  
Similarly, the Canadian Government’s classification of unauthorized arrivals as DFNs 
represented the state’s reassertion of control over those who had transgressed the border 
without the permission of the state. While, as Coutin notes, Salvadorans contributed to the 
shaping of their legal status in the US, this was largely possible because of the open-ended 
and flexible nature of the Salvadoran’s legal status. However, in negotiating their legal status, 
Coutin notes that the Salvadorans and activists established their right to residence status in 
the US on the basis of their need for political asylum, which had been denied to them.
43
 
Unlike the Salvadorans, DFNs may acquire a Convention refugee status. However, as noted 
in section 5, by linking DFN status with Convention refugee status, the state interprets the 
internationally recognised legal status in order to provide the minimum possible protection 
and rights to DFNs. In the case of the DFN, Canada has relied upon the fact that the DFN 
status is permissible, both legally and morally, because it is based on a strict interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention. 
                                                          
40
 As noted below, the state may nonetheless bring criminal proceedings against the DFN on the basis of not 
providing the correct documentation or for being unable to provide documentation upon arrival.  
41
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It is clear that in creating the status of DFN, Canada is attempting to establish borders beyond 
those that exist at the state’s territorial limits, which create divisions those considered to be 
officially ‘here’ and those whose presence in the state remains contested despite being 
physically in the territory of the state. As one Salvadoran stated in relation to his status in the 
United States: ‘[w]e need to be here legally or it’s like we’re not here’.44 While the legal 
status of the DFN refugee may not be as uncertain as that experienced by the Salvadorans, it 
demonstrates how easily the state may draw on the narrative of fear and the threat of the 
unknown to implement a legal status that excludes even those who are recognised as being in 
need of the protection of the state.   
4. THE DFN, BIOPOLITICS AND THE REGULATION OF SPACES 
The process of categorization, control and management of the DFN can be understood in 
terms of the exercise of biopower. As Foucault wrote, biopower is the means by which the 
modern government is able to manage life.
45
 Biopower is exerted over the entire population. 
It is evident in various facets of human life, from education systems to how the health of the 
nation is administered.
46
 Foucault referred to the techniques and practices used to produce, 
care for and/or dominate individual subjects as governmentality.
47
 The treatment of the DFN 
in Canada demonstrates a number of key features of the exercise of governmentality and 
biopower by the state. Many of those commenting on the PCISA referred to the idea that the 
government was punishing refugees for arriving to the state in a certain way.
48
 While this 
may certainly be seen to be true, it is also clear that from the time that the DFN arrives in the 
state, to the point at which she has been granted a permanent residence status, she is subject 
to a ‘calculated management of life’.49 This is reflected in the treatment of those who have 
been designated under the PCISA. They are subject to what Mountz et al have referred to as a 
‘refugee-like, quasi-documented, non-citizen’ status.50 The status has been deliberately 
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constructed by the state to maintain the DFN in an effective non-status. The DFN status is 
one that is deliberately unclear and marginalises the DFN within the Canadian legal system.  
Despite the fact that DFNs may be fleeing persecution, and therefore relying on Canada to 
provide them with protection, their visibility makes them a target for control and surveillance 
by the state.
51
 It is clear that the content of the PCISA was shaped by anxiety about the 
unauthorized arrival of the PCISA. This feeling of anxiety was not limited to those in 
government, but was also expressed by the general public. Krishnamurti states that feelings 
of disquiet among the public were evident in discussion boards and online blog postings.
52
 As 
she notes, the posts focused on how these arrivals would affect the status quo in Canada. As 
Massey has observed, ‘[a]n invasion of this place by something so different would, these 
local people argue, “destroy their way of life”’.53 The public reaction to these arrivals in 
Canada can be likened to what Butler refers to as the ‘manufactured public and legal hostility 
shown towards asylum seekers’.54 The state views the DFN’s mode of entry to the state as 
illegal. Thereafter, her legal status is delegitimized. She is known as a DFN and her presence 
is at best tolerated. These two elements working in tandem reinforce the DFNs ‘positions as 
both legal and spatial outlaws’.55  
The anxiety felt about the arrival of those aboard the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea 
resulted in a response by the government which sought to categorise, organise, and manage 
the refugees. It therefore embodied an exercise of governmentality. The underlying goal of 
the project of creating the DFN was, ‘ensuring that they are not disciplined, but 
regularized’.56 In this way, Canada’s DFN regime mirrors Foucault and Agamben’s accounts 
of how the 18
th
 century city managed the onset of the plague, which they saw as a 
paradigmatic example of governmentality. In his description of how the 18
th
 century city 
managed the onset of the plague, Foucault outlines how the authorities at the time dealt with 
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those with leprosy and those with the plague.
57
 Agamben notes that in the case of lepers, such 
persons are maintained outside the perimeter of the city.
58
 In this way, Agamben continues, 
the paradigm is based on ‘exclusion’. Those with leprosy are kept outside of the city to 
ensure that the risk of infection is managed. When the city has to deal with the plague 
however, Agamben posits that it is impossible to move those with the plague outside the 
city.
59
 Those persons must be managed within the boundaries of the city. This gives rise to an 
increase in the use of the technologies of control and surveillance. At some point however, as 
Foucault points out, the leper is treated like the plague victim and vice versa.
60
 The state 
therefore has to be prepared to accept the diseased bodies into its territory. However, those 
allowed to enter are surveilled and controlled within the territory until the state feels as 
though the risk to the state has dissipated. So while the DFN may be recognised as a refugee 
and permitted to leave detention and move throughout the state, she is still monitored and 
controlled for five years. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the plague as a form of disorder that is at once 
real and imaginary.
61
 The same can be said to be true of the arrival of refugee claimants to the 
ports of entry in Canada who would, under the PCISA, be deemed to be ‘designated’. The 
asylum seekers and refugees who are targeted in the proposed legislation are those who arrive 
in a very visible way to the shores of the state. Whether directly articulated or not, there is a 
general feeling of being invaded among the population, and this idea is capitalised upon by 
the media, who use provocative headlines and images of ships arriving and people 
disembarking.
62
 In this sense, the threat is real, tangible, and, given the short period of time 
between two most recent boat arrivals, the threat is also considered to be imminent and 
constantly recurring. However, the threat is also imaginary because, as Macklin and 
Waldman have pointed out, only a very small percentage of refugee claims in Canada come 
from those who have spontaneously arrived at its ports, and so would be affected by the 
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legislation.
63
 Nonetheless, the suspicion that is felt about such groups is analogous to the fear 
of infection at the time of the plague.  
The association of the DFN with a threat to the metaphorical health of the nation influences 
the regulatory response of the state, encouraging it to assume a spatial logic in how it 
manages and controls the groups of DFNs. The bodies of the DFNs are established in a 
different space from the ‘healthy’ nation. This occurs through the placement of the DFNs in 
detention immediately after they have arrived to the state, but also in how they are treated 
after they have been recognised as refugees. The DFN cannot travel outside Canada because 
she is not permitted to access a Convention Travel Document, as she is not considered to be 
‘lawfully staying’. She is also ‘punished’ for arriving unauthorized to the state by being 
denied access to family reunification until she acquires a permanent residence status in 
Canada. As Volpp has noted, ‘being here’ means something different to everyone present in 
the state, consequently describing this experience as ‘polysemic’.64   
The reporting requirement that the DFN must fulfil during the five year period that she is 
precluded from accessing permanent residence confirms the emergence of a tiered form of 
refugee protection in Canadian society. The requirement also further construes the DFN as a 
criminal presence within Canada. The DFN is under an obligation to report any change in her 
address to an immigration officer within 10 working days of this change.
65
 She must also 
report any change in her employment status, within 20 days of a change.
66
 The DFN must 
also report any departure from Canada, not less than 10 working days before the day of her 
departure, and also her return to Canada, within 10 working days of that occurring.
67
 The 
message that is conveyed is through these regulations is that these refugees are regarded with 
suspicion and that their tenuous legal status is under constant threat of being removed. This is 
especially clear from the fact that a DFN must report on the request of an officer when there 
is evidence that refugee status has ceased to exist, as set out in sections 108(1) (a) to (e) of the 
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IRPA.
68
 This engagement of the cessation provisions of the Refugee Convention echoes the 
Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) system established in Australia between 1999 and 2008, 
where a refugee could only gain access to a permanent residence status if she continued to 
fulfil the definition of the refugee.
69
 It is yet uncertain as to whether the cessation provisions 
will be routinely relied upon to cease the refugee status of DFNs, thereby opening the 
possibility that they may be returned to their country of origin. Even if the cessation 
provisions are not regularly invoked by the state as a means of removing the DFN, the 
possibility that they may be used in itself emphasises the precarious nature of the DFN status. 
The prospect of removal or deportation therefore hangs over the DFN while she waits to gain 
access to a permanent residence status.  
Under the Refugee Convention, the state is only required to allow the refugee to remain there 
for as long as the threat of persecution toward her remains in her country of origin.
70
 
Therefore, in terms of the Refugee Convention, not granting DFNs the right to apply for a 
permanent residence status for a period of five years after refugee status recognition is 
acceptable, as well as consistent with practice in other states.
71
 For all those with who are 
present in the state only on the basis of a refugee status, there is a continued risk that they will 
be deported, should the circumstances under which they were granted refugee status cease to 
exist. Under the PCISA, Canada has strictly interpreted refugee status so as to prevent the 
DFN from accessing a more durable residence status. This narrow interpretation however has 
also undermined a number of the key characteristics of refugee status, as envisaged at the 
time of drafting the Convention. Therefore, by justifying the creation of the DFN status on 
the basis of the Refugee Convention, the Canadian Government draws on the Convention to 
reduce, not expand refugee rights.  
                                                          
68
 ibid, s 174.1(2) 
69
 Item 785.22 and Item 866.22, Schedule 2, Migration Regulations 1994. See M O'Sullivan, 'Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. QAAH: Cessation of Refugee Status' (2006) 28 
Sydney L Rev 359-371, 362. 
70
 Art 1C5 of the Refugee Convention states: ‘This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under 
the terms of section A if… He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country 
of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this 
article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself 
of the protection of the country of nationality’ 
71
 During the debates leading up to the introduction of the PCISA, Minister Kenney noted that if Canada were to 
introduce a policy of temporary residence permits for all spontaneously arriving refugees, this would not be 
incongruent with established practice in other states, 
‘Some have worried that Canada was moving toward a conditional permanent residence situation for refugees, 
which I should point out is not unusual in other democratic countries. The United Kingdom and Germany, for 
example, do not grant immediate permanent residency for protected people’. House of Commons Debates, 41st 
Parl, 1
st
, No. 126, (17 May 2012) at 8301 (Jason Kenney).  
17 
 
5. JUSTIFYING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT: THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION AND THE PCISA  
As a result of a desire to deter refugees from using their own agency to enter the state 
spontaneously, the Canadian Government emphasises that such refugees should be punished 
through subjection to detention, a DFN status, and the use of surveillance-like reporting 
processes. This has been done in a manner which capitalises on their precarious existence and 
the idea that as DFNs they are never truly within the borders of the state.
72
 As noted, the 
treatment of the DFN refugee represents the state’s manipulation of the borders in order to 
exclude the DFN from gaining access to a refugee status comparable with that enjoyed by 
those who did not arrive to the state in the way described in the PCISA.  
For the DFN, the border is constituted at the point that she enters the state, but is also present 
in her everyday life for many years after she has been accepted as a refugee, until the point 
that she is able to attain a permanent residence status. As Balibar observes, she is ‘waiting to 
live, a non-life’.73 Rancière has written that refugees are individuals who are in effect 
‘stripped of their nationality’.74 The status of DFN perpetuates this situation, exacerbates it. 
The DFN refugee has been accepted as a refugee in theory, yet the treatment that she is 
subject to indicates that the state does not consider her to be a refugee in the truest sense. 
From the state’s point of view, her mode of entry has detracted from both her credibility and 
her deservedness. Given the state’s incredulity of her claim to protection, the DFN must be 
treated in a manner which reflects her lack of entitlement to a true international protection 
status.  
In a way, the state has attempted to re-draw the borders around the DFN through a legal 
intervention. At the same time however, the limits of the DFN status are very much 
determined by the refugee status, as set out in the Refugee Convention. DFN status is a 
version of Convention status that has been manipulated and restricted in order to ensure that 
many of the core rights normally associated with the status are not available to those who 
have been designated under the PCISA. This status is viewed as something that has been 
established in order to create a division between those who have arrived to the state by so-
called legitimate means and those who have been forced to enter the state by relying on 
smugglers.  
                                                          
72
 Volpp, above n 64, 457. 
73
 E Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (Verso Books, 1
st
 edn, 2002). 
74
 J Rancière, 'Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?' (2004) 103 (2) S Atl Quart 297-310, 300. 
18 
 
In order to legitimate the creation of the DFN status, the government has drawn heavily on 
the formal division of the rights accruing to refugees under the Refugee Convention on the 
basis of their level of attachment to the state. As Hathaway has noted, the Refugee 
Convention provides rights to refugees on an incremental basis.
75
 McAdam and Durieux also 
note that the architecture of the Refugee Convention is such that the longer the refugee is 
present in the state of asylum, the better the standard of treatment that she can expect.
76
 The 
categories under the Refugee Convention, in order of increasing attachment are, refugees 
subject to a state’s jurisdiction, refugees physically present, refugees lawfully present, and 
refugees durably residing. Under the PCISA, the government does not consider the DFN to 
not be lawfully staying under the PCISA for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
77
 As 
argued below, this defies accepted international law standards. It also defies common sense. 
The DFN is present for up to 5 years as a recognised refugee in the state is not to be 
considered to be lawfully staying. Therefore, while DFN status provides a legal status in 
Canada to certain refugees, it is a legal status that exists at the limits of political categories. 
5.1 DFNs: recognised refugees considered to be unlawfully staying 
Under the PCISA, DFNs are not recognised as ‘lawfully staying’ in the state.78 As a result, 
they are also not entitled to access a refugee travel document. The DFN is not considered to 
be lawfully staying even after she has been granted refugee status. This directly contradicts 
article 28(1) of the Refugee Convention, which says that states must provide refugees 
lawfully staying in the state with a convention travel document unless there are compelling 
reasons of national security and public order.
79
 As Ziegler notes, UNHCR has stated that 
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‘compelling reasons’, ‘national security’ and ‘public order’ must all be interpreted narrowly 
by the state.
80
 A travel document should therefore only be denied to a lawfully staying 
refugee in ‘grave and exceptional circumstances’.81 
Under the PCISA, DFNs are granted refugee status if they make a successful claim for 
asylum in the state. At no point in the legislation is there reference to the fact that the DFN is 
not considered to be a refugee under the legislation. Therefore, by not permitting a recognised 
refugee to avail of a ‘lawfully staying’ status, as set out in the Convention, the PCISA 
contradicts accepted practice in international refugee law.
82
  
In a submission made to the government when the PCISA was at bill stage, UNCHR noted 
that although there was no universally accepted meaning of the term ‘lawfully staying’, it was 
UNHCR’s view that ‘stay’ referred to ‘a permitted regularized stay of some duration’ and 
‘lawful’ was to be assessed on the basis of ‘prevailing national laws and regulations’.83 On 
this basis, refugees who had been formally recognised by the state should be considered to be 
lawfully staying in the host state, and therefore able to benefit from the Convention Travel 
Document (CTD).
84
 Reference to the DFN as not lawfully staying for the purposes of 
Convention is just one of the many ways that the presence of the DFN in Canada is 
delegitimized, despite the DFN refugee’s genuine claim for protection in the state. The 
process of de-legitimation happens at a number of scales, ranging from the international, 
where she is referred to as not lawfully staying under the Convention, to the domestic and 
local levels. This constant separation and classification of the DFN in opposition to all other 
refugees is presented as the means by which the system will be protected and preserved from 
the dangerous presence of the unauthorized refugee in the state.   
In the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration prior to the introduction of the 
PCISA, the reasons as to why the government denied DFN refugees access to a CTD were 
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made clear.
85
 Donald Galloway of the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers noted that 
when Canada signed up to the Refugee Convention in 1969, it entered reservations on two 
articles relating to the interpretation of the phrase ‘lawfully staying’.86 Article 28 was not one 
of those provisions. In his speech, Galloway notes that in not entering a reservation on article 
28, the state was providing refugees who had not yet acquired the right to be reunited with 
their families in Canada with an opportunity to be reunited with those family members in a 
neutral country. This provision of the PCISA appeared therefore to have been established in 
order to make entirely certain that the DFN refugee would not have the opportunity to be 
reunited with her family, even outside of Canada.  
The classification of the DFN refugee as not lawfully staying in the state for the purposes of 
article 28 of the Convention subverts one of the core purposes of Convention refugee status, 
which is to provide the refugee with a surrogate status, approaching the protection provided 
by citizenship. The ability to move within and beyond the state of asylum was considered to 
be one of the features of citizenship that needed to be emulated in the internationally 
recognised refugee status. As Holborn notes, the Nansen Passport, on which the CTD is 
modelled, was established as a response to the fact that pre-1951 refugees faced exclusion 
and social marginalisation because they did not have passports.
87
 At that time, it was vital for 
the refugee to have access to some form of documentation that allowed her to pursue a 
solution to her refugee status in the country of asylum, or in other states. The underlying 
purpose of the Nansen Passport, and thereafter the CTD, was to ensure the freedom of 
movement of the refugee. By facilitating this movement across borders, the refugee was free 
to travel in order to find a solution to her refugeehood.  
By preventing the DFN refugee from gaining access to a CTD, as well as preventing her from 
accessing a permanent residence status in the state, Canada has made targeted efforts to 
disrupt the integration of the DFN refugee in to Canadian society, or anywhere outside 
Canada. She is physically tied to the Canadian territory, but she inhabits a space that has been 
legally constructed to ensure her precarious status which is reinforced through her inability to 
gain access to her family either in Canada or any other territory. As noted above, this is also 
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ensured by the state through the reporting requirements that she must fulfil in order to attain 
permanent residence status.  
However, the establishment of the DFN status indicates more troubling developments with 
regard to the future kind of legal status that will be available to Convention refugees in the 
state. As was made apparent from statements made by the government in relation to the DFN 
status under the PCISA, Canada is now moving toward a model of refugeehood that does not 
offer spontaneously arriving refugees any more protection than the bare guarantee against 
refoulement. By interpreting the Convention in this way, Canada ensures that it can establish 
a second class refugee status, while at the same time professing to be acting in accordance 
with the Refugee Convention.  
5.2 Placing the Refugee Convention beyond the reach of the DFN 
As noted above, the way in which the DFN status has developed in the context of the PCISA 
continually emphasises that the DFN is not considered to be a ‘genuine’ refugee by the state. 
This is despite the fact that the DFN refugee has been recognised under the state’s refugee 
status determination procedure. It should also be noted that in the Convention itself, no 
reference is ever made to the fact that a refugee needs to fit Canadian Government’s vision of 
‘legitimacy’. There is no reference to a ‘correct’ way for the refugee to enter the state of 
asylum and there is no requirement that they make an asylum application in good faith in 
order to benefit from the content of the Convention.
88
  However, Minister Jason Kenney here 
sums up the Canadian perspective: 
The core of the convention is this: It's a commitment of non-refoulement. That is to 
say, if someone is deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the 
enumerated grounds, they will not be sent back to their country of origin. The reforms 
we propose, whether for smuggled migrants or those coming from designated 
countries, would absolutely respect the non-refoulement principle. There would not be 
two-tier treatment for people in that respect.
89
 
The DFN may only access a limited range of rights under the PCISA. It is evident therefore 
that DFN is a second class refugee in Canadian refugee law. Despite the clear divergence in 
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standards between the DFN and other refugees in the state, the government has nonetheless 
asserted that it still discharges its duty under the Refugee Convention because it believes that 
it has put a system in place which will ensure that those seeking the protection of Canada will 
not be refouled. By interpreting the standard of protection that the state is required to provide 
to refugees as bare non-refoulement, all other arguments that could be made against the 
implementation of the DFN on the basis of the rights set out in the Refugee Convention are 
effectively silenced. By reading the standard of protection that the state is required to provide 
as non-refoulement in relation to DFNs, the expected minimum standard of treatment falls not 
just for DFNs under the PCISA, but for all refugees. The establishment of the PCISA 
therefore asserts that any rights referred to in the Convention, other than the guarantee against 
refoulement are granted on the basis of the good will of the state. It is for this reason that 
refugee status can never really be considered as a surrogate citizenship status. Refugee status 
and the rights associated with it are constantly subject to reinterpretation and restriction by 
the state.  
6. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE PCISA UNDER THE CANADIAN 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The Canadian Government has presented the establishment of the PCISA and DFN status as a 
necessary response to the perceived increase in irregular migration and human smuggling to 
Canada. The limitations that the PCISA places on the DFN refugee’s legal status have been 
justified on the ground that the immigration system must be protected. As noted above, 
Canada’s domestic refugee law is increasingly influenced by securitization and exclusionary 
logic. However, under Canadian law, the legislature must account for any law that imposes a 
disadvantage on an individual because of their membership of a particular category. This 
right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is enshrined in the Canadian Charter, 
specifically in section 15. 
The Charter is legally binding on the federal Parliament as well as the provincial 
Legislatures.
90
 Since the establishment of the Charter, the courts have been more than willing 
to recognise the constitutional rights of non-citizens present in the state. In fact, the very first 
case heard by the Canadian Supreme Court relating to a Charter violation was by a non-
citizen refugee claimant. In Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the 
refugee status determination (RSD) procedure in place at the time was challenged on the 
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grounds that it violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter because it denied refugee claimants 
access to an oral hearing.
91
 In Singh, it was confirmed that the Charter applied to all people 
who were physically present in Canada.
92
 It was also affirmed that issues at stake in an RSD 
were of such a serious nature that depriving such rights would in fact amount to a 
‘deprivation of security of the person within the meaning of section 7’.93 From the outset 
therefore, the Charter has established itself as providing protection to citizens and non-
citizens alike.
94
 This includes the protection of equality and non-discrimination under the law. 
As section 15 of the Charter states:  
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object 
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability. 
The categories listed in section 15 are non-exhaustive and, over the years, the courts have 
developed three analogous categories that also enjoy the protection of section 15 of the 
Charter. They are citizenship,
95
 marital status,
96
 and sexual orientation.
97
 It should be noted 
that in the first determination relating to the application section 15, Andrews v Law Society of 
British Columbia, involved a case brought by a non-citizen. There, the Court found a 
violation of section 15 on the basis of an analogous category, citizenship. In Andrews, the 
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court confirmed that non-citizens present in Canada could rely on section 15 of the Charter.
98
 
Almost from the inception of the Charter therefore, non-citizens have been guaranteed the 
protection of section 15. 
On the basis of the decisions in Singh and Andrews, non-citizens would appear to benefit 
from extensive protection under the Charter. However, as Dauvergne has noted, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has not built on the promise of those early cases, and the Charter rights of 
non-citizens are often not heard or not addressed by the Court.
99
 As Macklin has stated, 
‘section 15…with its promise of equality before the law, has no traction when it comes to the 
exclusionary dimension of immigration law’.100 Nonetheless, the longstanding and persistent 
inclusion of the non-citizen under the protection of the Charter confirms the potential for the 
DFN refugee to assert her right not to be discriminated against on the basis of her 
categorisation under the PCISA.  
In Canada, when the courts assess whether there has been a violation of section 15 of the 
Charter, there are certain questions that they will ask. Peter Hogg identifies three elements to 
the test used to assess whether there has been a section 15 violation. The first issue is whether 
the challenged law imposes (directly or indirectly) on the claimant a disadvantage (in the 
form of a burden or withheld benefit) in comparison to other comparable persons. The second 
issue is whether the disadvantage is based on a ground listed in or analogous to a ground 
listed in section 15. Finally, the court will assess whether the disadvantage also constitutes an 
impairment of the human dignity of claimant.
101
 If the claimant can show that these elements 
are present, the burden then shifts to the government to justify the discriminatory law under 
section 1 of the Charter.
102
  
6.1 Is it possible to argue that DFN status is contrary to section 15 of the Charter? 
The first issue addressed by a court in a section 15 case is whether ‘[t]he presence of 
disadvantage (or unequal treatment) requires a comparison between the legal position of 
claimant and that of other people to whom the claimant may legitimately invite 
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comparison’.103 Unlike Andrews, which compared the position of the citizen and the non-
citizen, the comparator for the disadvantage that the DFN is subject is the ‘regular’ refugee, 
who has not been designated under the PSICA.
104
 
As Rosiers and Mendelsohn Aviv have noted in relation to the PCISA: 
The distinction between ‘designated’ and ‘regular’ refugees is just one example of the 
discriminatory distinctions created by Bill C-31 [later the PCISA], which creates 
various categories of asylum seekers, with different timelines and different rules with 
regard to the refugee claim process, eligibility for appeal, and more. Others of these 
classes and categories will also be designated by the Minister at his or her discretion, 
rather than through transparent, democratic methods.
105
 
The various ways in which the DFN refugee is treated disadvantageously in comparison to 
‘regular’ refugees have been set out in detail above. It should also be noted that DFN status is 
distinguished as a particularly discriminatory status because of the length of time that it 
applies to an individual present in Canada. It is a status that defies the categories of asylum 
seeker and refugee, and carves out a new sub-status in law. 
The second issue to be assessed is whether the disadvantage is based on a ground listed in, or 
analogous to a ground listed in, section 15. As noted above, the court in Andrews recognised 
citizenship as an analogous ground, therein also recognising non-citizens as a group that may 
claim the protection of section 15. The Court in Andrews referred to the distinct political 
disadvantage that non-citizens faced in Canada because they were not represented at 
governmental level. This, Justice Wilson stated, established their position as a particularly 
vulnerable group in society. Justice Wilson then went on to note that: 
While legislatures must inevitably draw distinctions among the governed, such 
distinctions should not bring about or reinforce the disadvantage of certain groups and 
individuals by denying them the rights freely accorded to others.
106
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By recognising non-citizens’ rights under section 15, the court in Andrews intended to 
compensate for the political powerlessness of the non-citizen in comparison to the citizen. 
However, Justice Wilson’s statement must be considered in the context of Canada’s 
immigration and refugee laws, which limit the rights of entry and residence of immigrants, 
refugees, and refugee claimants. While the court in Andrews established non-citizens as an 
analogous category under section 15, Thwaites notes that it nonetheless did not comment on 
‘the tension between section 15’s guarantee of equality of treatment and the fact that non-
citizens do not have an express constitutional right to remain in Canada’.107 Like other 
sovereign states, Canada retains its power to determine who may enter and remain in the 
state. However, this power is restrained by the state’s duties under the Refugee Convention as 
well as its broader duty of non-refoulement in international law.  
In Andrews, the court recognised non-citizens as a ‘discrete and insular minority’.108 Yet, 
refugees are doubly disadvantaged as a group. Not only are they not citizens of Canada, but 
they are also unable to avail of the protection of their country of origin. DFNs, as an effective 
sub-category of refugees, have an even more limited opportunity to assert their rights. This is 
evident from the fact that the trajectory of the DFN’s life is almost entirely subject to 
Ministerial discretion. Ministerial discretion is often viewed as a necessary element in a 
functioning immigration system. However, already noted, discretionary decisions affect the 
lives of DFNs in a much more significant way than that experienced by ‘regular’ refugees. As 
stated by the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights at the University of Toronto: 
The enormous scope of Ministerial discretion that pervades Bill C-31 [now the 
PCISA] suggests that should the bill pass, Charter challenges will not be limited to 
scrutinizing the letter of the law, but will also include attacks on the Minister’s 
exercise of these unprecedented levels of discretion.
109
 
Concern over the increasing scope of Ministerial discretion emerging in Canadian 
immigration and refugee law has also been voiced by Dauvergne. She has suggested that 
since Suresh, Ministerial discretion has effectively been ‘constitutionalized’.110 The deference 
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that the state affords Ministerial discretion is particularly troubling for the DFN, both prior to, 
and following her acquisition of refugee status. The designation process itself reduces 
individuals to subjects of administrative function, effectively depoliticising them. As Rajaram 
and Anderas note, it is just the first step in the ‘technicalisation’ of the refugee claimant.111 
Technicalisation and bureaucratisation of the DFN enables states to manage and control such 
groups. As Rajaram notes, bureaucracies are a means of making political subjects, as well as 
emphasising state authority over a territory.
112
 The establishment of two different types of 
refugee under the PCISA (the DFN refugee and the ‘regular’ refugee), can be referred to as 
what Zartaloudis calls ‘bureaucratical fractioning’.113 One significant way in which 
bureaucratisation allows the state to exert power over such a group is to limit the ability of 
the judiciary to interpret the laws that establish the categorisations of protection. This is 
linked to the increased deference to Ministerial discretion, noted above.
114
This is what faces 
the DFN and is perhaps the most significant obstacle to her assertion of her section 15 rights 
under the Charter. 
The third issue examined in courts’ assessment of a section 15 violation is whether the law in 
question constitutes an impairment to her human dignity. This test was established in the 
1999 case, Law v Canada.
115
 The test has been subject to a considerable degree of criticism. 
Gilbert, commenting on the requirement established in Law, has stated that ‘[a] test that 
requires claimants to show a ground of discrimination and a violation of their human dignity 
is onerous, vague, and beset by significant judicial subjectivism’.116 In Law, in order to 
determine whether one’s human dignity has been impaired, the court assessed the:  
1) pre-existing disadvantage, if any, of the claimant group; (2) degree of 
correspondence between the differential treatment and the claimant group’s reality; 
(3) whether the law or program has an ameliorative purpose or effect; and (4) the 
nature of the interest affected.
117
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In R v Kapp, it was subsequently pointed out by the court that these questions did not 
necessarily relate to the issue of the impairment of human dignity, but rather the perpetuation 
of disadvantage or stereotyping.
118
 In Lovelace v Ontario, the human dignity requirement was 
described as a way of weeding out more trivial complaints that did not engage the purpose of 
the equality provision.
119
 This article has already described in detail the various ways in 
which the DFN refugee suffers serious disadvantage in comparison to other refugees. She is 
subject to detention upon arrival, and thereafter her freedom of movement continues to be 
restricted until she acquires a permanent residence status. Also, the fact that she is unable to 
access family reunification for five years after she has been recognised as a refugee 
compounds the disadvantage that she experiences in comparison to other refugees in Canada.  
Finally, it should be noted that during the course of its passage through the legislative houses, 
the government did not overtly engage in a substantive defence of the constitutionality of the 
legislation. This was something that was pointed out by Macklin during her submission to the 
Standing Committee.
 120
 Throughout the debates, the government failed to attest to the 
constitutionality of the legislation. Additionally, it should be noted that because the PCISA is 
an omnibus statute, it has an extremely broad scope. Therefore, its provisions raise 
constitutional concerns in relation to a variety of issues, not limited to the DFN status.
121
 The 
reaction of the government suggests that it is aware of the resources and time that would be 
needed to challenge any aspect of the omnibus legislation. The manner in which the DFN 
status has been introduced may therefore be quite strategic in nature. Unfortunately, the fact 
that Bill C-31 became the PCISA at all has signalled a serious regression in Canadian 
immigration and asylum law, a regression from which it will be very hard to recover.  
6.2 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care and others v Attorney General of Canada and 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. 
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Despite the negative effects of the PCISA noted above, a recent ruling from the Canadian 
Federal Court offers some hope in the face of the increasingly regressive asylum and refugee 
laws and policies that have been introduced in Canada in recent years. In Canadian Doctors 
for Refugee Care and others v Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, the Federal Court strongly asserted that distinctions made between categories of 
asylum seekers on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices was in violation of section 15 of the 
Charter.
122
 In the case, heard by Justice Mactavish, the court strongly defended the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers under the Charter, thus confirming the continued availability of 
Charter protections to such vulnerable groups.  
Canadian Doctors was a judicial review of the Federal Government’s decision to 
considerably reduce, and in a number of instances, completely do away with, the health care 
available to certain asylum seekers and refugees in Canada.
123
 In Canada, since 1957, the 
federal government has directly financed ‘temporary basic, essential, and urgent health care’ 
for new arrivals to Canada until such a time as they were permitted to claim provincial 
coverage.
124
 The programme is referred to as the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). As 
Macklin notes, the programme has developed over the years, and by 2012 it covered most 
refugees and asylum seekers in Canada.
125
 In that same year however, significant changes 
were made to the list of who would be entitled to access health insurance under the 
programme. While under the changes, resettled refugees’ healthcare entitlements remained 
unaltered, asylum seekers were only entitled to receive urgent and essential healthcare, and 
asylum seekers from Designated Countries of Origin (DCO) were denied healthcare coverage 
unless their illness posed a threat to public health and safety.
126
  
In the judicial review, the applicants argued that the changes made to the IFHP in 2012 would 
create a ‘health care hierarchy’ where the lives of certain refugees, and asylum seekers, as 
well as other legally residing migrants would be ‘deemed less worthy of public protection’.127 
In many ways, the 2012 policy mirrored the distinctions that were created with the 
establishment of the DFN status, between ‘legitimate’ and ‘deserving’ refugees and ‘bogus’ 
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and ‘illegitimate’ refugees. Like the DFN status, the main intention behind the changes made 
to the IFHP was to discourage asylum seekers from coming to Canada to seek protection. In 
the case of the latter, however, the ultimate effect of the changes was to place the lives of 
asylum seekers at risk.  
In the case, Justice Mactavish found that the treatment of the abovementioned categories of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Canada had been in violation of sections 12 and 15 of the 
Charter. Justice Mactavish determined that the change in policy of the IFHP amounted to 
‘treatment’ as per section 12 of the Charter. She also stated that this treatment was ‘cruel and 
unusual’ within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter. In her reasoning, Justice Mactavish 
placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that this policy shift affected children who had 
been brought to Canada by their parents. Justice Mactavish strongly condemned the policy on 
this basis, stating: 
The 2012 modifications to the Interim Federal Health Program potentially jeopardize 
the health, the safety and indeed the very lives, of these innocent and vulnerable 
children in a manner that shocks the conscience and outrages our standards of 
decency. They violate section 12 of the Charter.
128
  
Justice Mactavish also found that the change in policy was in violation of section 15 of the 
Charter because of the fact that it provided a lower level of state-funded health insurance 
cover to asylum seekers from Designated Countries of Origin (DCOs) in comparison to 
asylum seekers from non-DCOs. Under section 109.1(1) of the PCISA, the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration was given the power to categorize certain countries as DCOs.
129
 
Countries were designated as DCOs if it was considered that they were generally safe to live 
in. The underlying assumption was therefore that if an individual from a DCO made an 
asylum claim in Canada, the likelihood was that it was a false claim. Under the Act, asylum 
seekers from DCOs are subject to an expedited refugee status determination process, and do 
not have the right of appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
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Board. As of 10 October 2014, there are 42 countries on the list.
130
 Most of those countries on 
the list were EU Member States, however the list is not limited to EU Member States.
131
  
Justice Mactavish rejected the applicants’ assertion that the changes to the IFHP was 
discriminatory under section 15 of the Charter on the analogous ground of ‘immigration 
status’.132 However, Justice Mactavish did go on to determine whether the policy was 
discriminatory under section 15 on the basis of ‘national or ethnic origin’, an enumerated 
category under section 15 of the Charter.
133
 On this ground, Justice Mactavish then went on 
to consider whether treating asylum seekers differently because they had arrived from DCOs 
amounted to discriminatory treatment on the basis of those asylum seekers’ national or ethnic 
origin.  
The Attorney General and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the respondents in 
the case, argued that those affected by the changes in policy were not discriminated on the 
basis of national or ethnic origin because a variety of countries had been categorized as 
DCOs.
134
 Therefore, according to the respondents, ‘distinctions made between foreign 
nationals of diverse origins do not constitute discrimination on the basis of “national or ethnic 
origin”’.135 Justice Mactavish rejected this argument, stating, ‘[t]he fact that a program may 
explicitly exclude Asians, Hispanics and Blacks does not make it any less discriminatory than 
a program that only excludes Asians’.136 
Justice Mactavish then went on to address the respondents’ argument that the distinction 
created between types of asylum seekers on basis of whether they came from DCOs was 
justified under section 15(2) of the Charter. The respondents asserted that the distinction was 
defensible because of the fact that removing certain benefits from DCO asylum seekers, 
allowed the government to redirect money in order to take care of the needs asylum claims 
from countries that would take a longer time for the authorities to process.
137
 This argument 
once again echoes the logic expressed by the government during the parliamentary debates 
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leading up to the introduction of the status of DFN, noted above.
138
 As in the case of the 
DFN, the respondents in the present case also implied that the IFHP policy was justified 
because asylum seekers from DCOs were not legitimately in need of protection in Canada.  
In addressing this argument, the Court recalled the decision in Kapp, which assessed the 
applicability of section 15(2) of the Charter.
139
 Justice Mactavish noted that in Kapp, the 
Supreme Court stated that in order to understand whether a government programme was an 
ameliorative programme for the purposes of section 15(2), the government had to show that 
the programme is ‘a genuinely ameliorative program directed at improving the situation of a 
group that is in need of ameliorative assistance in order to enhance substantive equality’.140  
Justice Mactavish noted that ameliorative programmes generally bestowed benefits on a 
particular group, and did not deny them, as in the present case.
141
 She therefore refused to 
recognise that the exclusion of certain asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers from 
accessing core health benefits was necessary to the ameliorative goal stated. Justice 
Mactavish added that it was also not clear how such a programme ‘advances a goal of 
enhancing substantive equality’.142 Quoting the Supreme Court judgment of AG v A143, 
Justice Mactavish stated, ‘if the state conduct widens the gap between the historically 
disadvantaged group and the rest of society, rather than narrowing it, then it is 
discriminatory’.144 It was therefore found that the distinction between asylum seekers from 
DCOs and asylum seekers from non-DCOs did not contribute to the government’s overall 
stated purpose of the ‘amelioration of the health conditions of refugee claimants, refugees and 
failed claimants in particular circumstances of need in Canada’.145  
Justice Mactavish, having found that the programme could not be defended under section 
15(2), then returned to her analysis of section 15(1). She considered whether the programme 
violated this subsection by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. Justice Mactavish’s 
analysis of this issue is of particular note because of the implications it may have for the 
status of DFN. Justice Mactavish noted that the respondent had stated that the DCOs were 
offered a level of state-funded health insurance coverage, and the distinctions that had been 
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made between DCO and non-DCO asylum seekers did not perpetuate prejudice or 
stereotyping because it simply recognised that the healthcare systems of the DCOs were of 
the same standard as that offered in Canada. 
Justice Mactavish noted a number of flaws with this assertion made by the respondents. She 
observed that while some of the DCOs may have an equivalent standard of healthcare to that 
provided in Canada, this could not be said to be true of all DCOs.
146
 She also noted that the 
argument that there was an equivalent healthcare system in the country of origin implied that 
the asylum seeker was free to return to her country of origin and seek the healthcare that she 
needed there. This assumption about the refugee claimant’s ability to return therefore 
indicated a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada’s non-refoulement obligation. Further, 
Justice Mactavish noted that, ‘[i]mplicit in this argument is the assumption that there is no 
merit to the individual’s refugee claim and they are indeed “bogus” refugees…’.147 Justice 
Mactavish observed that the change in programme had been implemented in order to address 
the government’s overall goal of preventing people coming to Canada to ‘“game the system” 
and abuse the generosity of Canadians’.148 This was asserted by the state even though it was 
acknowledged that there was no clear evidence that access to healthcare in Canada was a 
major ‘pull’ factor for asylum claimants or that there had been any serious abuse of the 
healthcare system by asylum seekers in Canada.
149
 There was also nothing to suggest that 
asylum seekers from DCO countries were better able to pay for healthcare than asylum 
seekers from non-DCOs. Justice Mactavish noted that the position of the asylum seeker from 
a DCO was further aggravated by the fact that under new regulations, such an asylum seeker 
was unable to work in Canada for her first 180 days in the state.
150
 
Justice Mactavish therefore found for a violation of section 15 of the Charter on the grounds 
that ‘[t]he distinction is based upon the national origin of the refugee claimants and does not 
form part of an ameliorative program’ and that ‘[i]t is, moreover, based upon stereotyping, 
and serves to perpetuate the disadvantage suffered by member of an admittedly vulnerable, 
poor and disadvantaged group’.151 Finally, Justice Mactavish found that the respondents had 
not demonstrated that the 2012 changes to the IFHP were justified under section 1 of the 
Charter. Section 1 of the Charter gives the government a chance to defend the introduction of 
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a measure that is otherwise in violation of section 15 on the basis of a proportionality test. 
The government therefore attempted to justify the change in IFHP policy on the basis that it 
helped ensure fairness to all Canadians, that it saved money, that it protected public health 
and safety, and that it protected the ‘integrity’ of the Canadian asylum system by deterring 
bogus claims.
152
  
Justice Mactavish rejected the fairness argument made by the government because under the 
IFHP, asylum seekers never had access to a higher standard of healthcare than that available 
to citizens of Canada under the IFHP.
153
 Justice Mactavish also rejected the assertion that the 
measure saved money, as many of the costs that the government assured that it had saved had 
simply been absorbed by the provinces.
154
 Justice Mactavish further refused to accept the 
argument that the policy change served to benefit public health and safety as in reality; it 
merely prevented people from accessing necessary healthcare.
155
 Rather than promote public 
health and safety therefore, the policy change in fact seriously undermined it. 
Justice Mactavish then went on to address what was perhaps the greatest motivation behind 
the government’s introduction of the change to the IFHP, the idea that this change in policy 
would discourage asylum seekers arriving to the state and making false asylum claims. In so 
doing, the government claimed, the integrity of the asylum system would be protected. 
Justice Mactavish acknowledged that deterring false asylum claims was a legitimate goal to 
be pursued by the government.
156
 However, the government had nonetheless failed to provide 
evidence to support its assertion that removing healthcare from certain asylum seekers would 
actually help achieve this aim. While Justice Mactavish agreed that access to free healthcare 
might be an incentive for people to come and seek asylum in Canada, she stated that she had 
not been presented with sufficient evidence to suggest that this was the chief motivating 
factor for the arrival of asylum seekers from the DCOs.
157
 Because the government was 
unable to justify the programme for any of the abovementioned reasons, it was deemed to be 
unconstitutional. However, as noted in the most Canadian Doctors federal decision, the 2014 
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decision is currently under appeal and on October 31 2014, the Federal Court of Appeal 
dismissed a motion for a stay of the original judgment. 
158
  
The decision in the Canadian Doctors case was undoubtedly a major coup for those fighting 
for the protection of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Canada. The finding for 
discrimination on the basis of section 15 is also particularly encouraging from the perspective 
of those who have been categorized as DFNs under the PCISA. Much like those affected in 
the above case, DFNs are targeted on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices about the 
motivations behind their arrival in Canada to claim asylum. As noted above, the court was 
particularly critical of the lack of evidence that the government was able to provide to justify 
such a major policy shift that had such serious ramifications for a significant group in 
Canadian society. Similarly, as I have documented above, the government has also failed to 
provide clear evidence that the introduction of the DFN status would in fact reduce the 
number of false asylum claims through deterring people from arriving to the state. As already 
noted, the DFN system instead merely punishes all asylum seekers who rely on smugglers to 
enter Canada to claim asylum.  
However, the fact that the decision in relation to section 15 of the Charter in Canadian 
Doctors was made on the ground of national and ethnic origin may act as a limitation to the 
potential section 15 arguments that could be made in relation to the DFN status. As noted 
above, the Court rejected arguments made by the applicants, that immigration status should 
be recognized as an analogous category under section 15. Justice Mactavish pointed out that 
immigration status was not necessarily an immutable characteristic, and that the Federal 
Court of Appeal, by which she was bound, had already ruled that immigration status was not 
an analogous status under section 15.
159
  
In Canadian Doctors, the choice to recognise section 15 rights on the ground of ‘national and 
ethnic origin’ was logical, given the nature of how the asylum seeker was affected by the 
DCO. While the respondents argued that this ground could not be relied up because of the 
variety of countries on the list, there was still a list which stated a finite number of DCOs. 
The countries targeted by the change in policy could therefore be identified. The same cannot 
however be said of those who are affected by the DFN status. While experience has shown 
that certain countries are more likely to produce asylum seekers who seek asylum in Canada 
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by boat, the law does not refer to a list of countries that will be affected by the DFN status, as 
in the case of the DCO. Therefore, in the case of the DFN, it becomes more difficult to assert 
that DFNs are discriminated on the enumerated ground of ‘national or ethnic origin’.  
While Justice Mactavish noted that she was not permitted to make a finding for immigration 
status as an analogous category on the basis of rulings in higher courts, there have other cases 
where immigration status was in fact recognised as an analogous ground under section 15. In 
Jaballah (Re), discrimination on the basis of immigration status was recognised in the context 
of the availability of detention review.
160
 Mr Jaballah, was a foreign national who was 
detained on the basis of a security certificate. He was only entitled to detention review when 
the reasonableness of the security certificate had been determined. This contrasted with the 
position of permanent residents who were detained on the basis of a security certificate. Such 
permanent residents were entitled to detention review every six months. The Court ruled that 
the difference in treatment between Mr Jaballah as a foreign national and permanent resident, 
was in violation of section 15 of the Charter. The Court thereby ordered that Mr Jaballah 
have access to detention review on the same basis as permanent residents. In her judgment in 
Canadian Doctors, however, Mactavish stated that she was bound by the decision in 
Toussaint that states that immigration status cannot be recognised as an analogous ground 
because it is not ‘immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity’.161  
It is suggested here however, that the requirement of ‘immutability’ for a category to be 
recognised as an analogous ground under section 15 does open up a possibility for DFN 
refugees to argue their right not to be discriminated against. It is submitted that the DFN may 
assert that she comes under an analogous category for the purposes of section 15 of the 
Charter. It acknowledged that there are challenges in arguing for the recognition of 
‘immigration status’ as an analogous category. However, it may be possible for the DFN to 
argue for the recognition of DFN status as a category under section 15 instead. In Canadian 
Doctors, Justice Mactavish refers to Irshad v Ontario (Minister of Health), 162 where 
immigration status was also not recognised as an analogous ground because of the fact that it 
was subject to change. In Irshad, many of the applicants who were challenging 
discrimination on the ground of immigration status under section 15, had themselves become 
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permanent residents by the time the case was heard. Yet, DFN refugee status is not subject to 
a sudden change like this. The DFN is not permitted to even apply for permanent residence 
status for at least five years after she has been recognised as a refugee. The position of the 
DFN refugee is also set in the broader context that, as a refugee, her protection status does 
not cease to exist either until she reacquires the protection of her country of origin, or 
assumes another citizenship.  
This position has recently been emphasised in Canada. Following another 2012 policy 
change, the government has carried out cessation proceedings against refugees with 
permanent residence status.
163
 If a refugee with permanent residence status has travelled to 
her country of origin, the authorities have used such trips as evidence that refugee status has 
ceased because the refugee has re-availed herself of the protection of her country of origin. If 
the authorities find that the refugee status of the permanent resident refugee had ceased to 
exist, this would result in her losing her permanent residence status as well as her refugee 
status. This leaves her inadmissible in Canada, and vulnerable to possible removal 
proceedings. While this policy in relation to cessation may be viewed as sharp practice, it 
does confirm that refugee status is not changeable in the same way as other immigration 
statuses. In Canada, even when the refugee acquires permanent residence status in Canada, 
she is still also identified as a refugee by the Canadian government. Therefore, it is submitted 
that refugee status demonstrates the immutability that is required for the recognition of an 
analogous category under section 15 of the Charter.  
For the reasons stated above, it is advanced that it is possible for the DFN refugee to dispute 
her designation and the subsequent limitation of her rights as a discriminatory practice under 
section 15 of the Charter. The distinctions that are made between DFNs and other refugees 
under the PCISA are just as arbitrary as the distinctions noted above, in the context of the 
2012 IFHP policy. Equally, as already noted above, the government did not provide clear 
evidence that the establishment of a DFN status would lead to either a reduction in the rate of 
human smuggling, or a reduction in the number of false asylum claims. The Canadian 
Doctors case therefore sends a strong warning to the Canadian Government, that it cannot 
simply establish asylum policies solely on the basis that it will deter asylum seekers from 
entering the state. In Canadian Doctors, while it was recognised that the government is 
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entitled to establish asylum laws designed to protect the integrity of the asylum system, those 
rules must nonetheless adhere to constitutionally protected principles. In general therefore, 
the decision in Canadian Doctors stresses that the government’s policies must be based on 
established facts that clearly link to the objective to be pursued in the policies. Further, these 
policies must also be proportionate in terms of the legitimate aim sought to be achieved. This 
was clearly not the case in the 2012 IFHP policy change, and it is argued here that this is also 
not the case in the context of the DFN refugee under the PCISA.
164
  
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
DFN refugee status represents a scalar shift in Canadian refugee law. At the point at which 
the DFN is designated, crucial decisions are made about who that person is, for example, in 
relation to how she arrived to the state, and whether she is part of a group. In general, it is 
assessed whether she ‘fits’ the definition of the DFN. These decisions ultimately influence 
whether she is considered to be a regular asylum seeker, or whether she is to become a DFN. 
As noted, if she is deemed to fall into the latter category, she is treated primarily as an 
individual who has illegally entered the state through smuggling. She is considered to 
effectively act as a proxy for the actual smuggler, who is in this context portrayed to be 
beyond the reach of the Canadian criminal justice system. Here, I have emphasised that the 
designation of individuals under the PCISA should not just be viewed as an inevitable 
response to the arrival of migrants to the state by boat, but as a specific choice made by the 
state as to how migrants arriving to the state by boat should be governed. The DFN is 
therefore excluded by the state at various levels and in a variety of spaces through the 
operation of Ministerial discretion.  
The PCISA represents a troubling creep of the practice of Ministerial discretion which has the 
effect of restricting the core principles of refugee law and international human rights law. The 
restrictions placed on the DFN under the PCISA reveal the complexity of the bureaucratic 
system in Canada. It is a system that creates a series of barriers between state rhetoric with 
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respect to its adherence to the Refugee Convention, and the reality faced by the DFN, where 
avenues to redress and opportunities to hold the state to account on the basis of its obligations 
under the Convention are increasingly closed off. Despite this, Canada has guaranteed the 
principle of non-discrimination to Canadian citizens and non-citizens alike under section 15 
of the Charter. As evident from the Canadian Doctors case, the asylum seeker or the refugee 
may rely on the protection of section 15 to successfully contest discriminatory laws and 
policies. Canadian Doctors affirms that the state cannot rely on stereotypes about asylum 
seekers and refugees to enact policies that marginalise and discriminate between categories of 
such groups. Canadian Doctors also emphasises that the government must substantiate the 
need for restrictive asylum policies with clear facts and evidence. When the government 
created DFN status, it failed to clearly set out how the creation of such a restrictive status 
would result in the reduction of the human smuggling into Canada. Here it is argued that the 
protection against discrimination enshrined in section 15 of the Charter, as well as the 
decision in Canadian Doctors, confirms that DFN status is unconstitutional.  
When the state relies on Ministerial discretion and administrative procedures to manage and 
control refugee populations, the refugee and the asylum seeker are often left feeling 
powerless and that they are unable to dispute their treatment. Over time, discriminatory 
treatment against such groups is viewed not only as acceptable, but something to be expected. 
This treatment is continually justified on the ground that it is necessary to protect the asylum 
system from those who might seek to take advantage of it. When a state invokes such a 
justification for a restrictive policy or law, they often enjoy complete impunity from 
challenge. However, the decision in Canadian Doctors emphasises that the state remains 
accountable under the Charter, even to asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, while there is 
no doubt that the asylum seeker and the refugee in Canada now face unprecedented 
restrictions and obstacles to protection, the power of the government to limit their rights 
remains subject to challenge under the Charter.  
 
